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Kames’s Legal Career and Writings
as Precedents for
Elements of Criticism
Abstract: Scholars have seldom explored relationships among Lord
Kames’s legal career and writings and Elements of Criticism. After
considering why Kames did not write a rhetoric of legal advocacy, I
argue that Kames’s legal career and writings offered precedents for
Elements in three areas: fulfilling social aspirations, using principles
of human nature for pedagogical purposes, and using a mode
of reasoning that involved abstracting principles from particular
cases. I provide a more complete understanding of the Elements and
suggest that aims and methods of Scots law may have penetrated
eighteenth-century Scottish rhetorics more broadly.
H
enry Home, Lord Kames was an advocate and judge on
Scotland’s supreme civil and criminal courts, and was
involved in the legal profession from about 1712 when he
probably began to study law until a few months before his death
in 1782.1 Although like other Scottish literati Kames published on a
variety of topics, including agriculture, natural history, and moral
1Two twentieth-century biographies are Ian Simpson Ross, Lord Kames and the
Scotland of His Day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) and William C. Lehmann,
Henry Home, Lord Kames, and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Study in National Character and
in the History of Ideas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). For an overview of Kames’s
career with particular attention to his legal works, see David M. Walker, The Scottish
Jurists (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1985), 220–47. Three important sources of biographical
material from Kames’s contemporaries are: John Ramsay, Scotland and Scotsmen in
the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols., ed. Alexander Allardyce (Edinburgh, 1888); Alexander
Fraser Tytler, Lord Woodhouselee, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Honourable
Henry Home of Kames, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1814); and James Boswell, Private
Papers of James Boswell from Malahide Castle, vol. 15, eds. Geoffrey Scott and Frederick
A. Pottle (N.p., 1932).
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philosophy, most of his publications are on legal subjects and cover a
range of areas: four collections of decisions of the Court of Session and
a collection of statute law, two collections of essays on particular titles
in Scots law, two historical treatments of legal subjects, and a work on
equity. His legal writings span his entire career: Remarkable Decisions
of the Court of Session. From 1716 to 1728 (1728); Essays Upon Several
Subjects in Law (1732); The Decisions of the Court of Session, from its
first Institution to the Present Time. Abridged, and Digested under proper
Heads, in Form of a Dictionary (1741); Statute Law of Scotland Abridged.
With Historical Notes (1757); Essays upon Several Subjects concerning
British Antiquities (1747); Historical Law-Tracts (1758); Principles of
Equity (1760); Remarkable Decisions of the Court of Session. From the
year 1730 to the year 1752 (1766); Elucidations Respecting the Common
and Statute Law of Scotland (1777); and Select Decisions of the Court of
Session. From the year 1752 to the year 1768 (1780).2
Historians and philosophers of legal thought have discussed
Kames’s legal works, but students of rhetoric remember Kames for
Elements of Criticism (1762).3 With one exception,4 neither group has
2Kames’s Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1751) is a moral
work, but for a discussion of it as well as Essays on Several Subjects in Law and Essays
upon Several Subjects Concerning British Antiquities from a legal perspective, see Duncan
Forbes, “Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment,” in R. H. Campbell and Andrew
S. Skinner eds., The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: John
Donald, 1982), 186–204 (pp. 197–9). For a list of Kames’s publications see Ronald
Hamowy, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 57–9.
3Discussions of his legal works include Peter Stein, “Legal Thought in Eigh-
teenth-Century Scotland,” Juridical Review n. s. 2 (1957): 1–20 (pp. 9–12); David M.
Walker, “Equity in Scots Law,” Juridical Review 66 (1954): 103–47; David Lieberman,
“The Legal Needs of a Commercial Society: the Jurisprudence of Lord Kames,” in Ist-
van Hont and Michael Ignatieff eds., Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy
in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 203–34;
and the two chapters on Kames in David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Deter-
mined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989). On Scots law and the Enlightenment with reference to Kames and others,
see Neil MacCormick, “Law and Enlightenment,” in R. H. Campbell and Andrew S.
Skinner eds., The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: John
Donald, 1982), 150–66; and on capital punishment in particular, see Ferenc Hörcher,
“Beccaria, Voltaire, and the Scots on Capital Punishment: A Comparative View of the
Legal Enlightenment,” in Deidre Dawson and Pierre Morère eds., Scotland and France
in the Enlightenment (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2004) 305–30 (pp. 317–22).
4Ian Simpson Ross, “Scots Law and Scots Criticism: The Case of Lord Kames,”
Philological Quarterly 45 (1966): 614–23 and Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 262–5,
discusses Elements in relation to Scots law in general more so than Kames’s legal
writings in particular. Ross links the title and organization of Elements to works
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explored relationships among Kames’s legal career and writings
and Elements, perhaps because his legal works do not cover the
topic of pleading and because Elements is a rhetoric of criticism—
it recommends how to make arguments on matters of taste rather
than how to make legal arguments.5 In this essay I argue that his
legal career and writings offer precedents for Elements. I do not deny
that Elements is a product of a number of thinkers and traditions,
including Shaftesbury and Hutcheson,6 Hume,7 Newtonianism,8 the
mechanist tradition,9 or French criticism;10 nor do I deny that Elements
is shaped by its broader sociopolitical context.11 But highlighting
legal precedents offers insight into the organization, content, and
reasoning of Elements, a work often read with respect to histories of
literary or aesthetic ideas and sometimes with respect to rhetorical
traditions;12 and it continues the project of relating eighteenth-century
by Mackenzie and Stair respectively. He notes that induction and historical and
comparative awareness characterize both the legal writing and Elements, and that
Kames’s view of taste as analogous to the moral sense is consistent with his advocacy
of a duty-oriented legal system.
5Beth Innocenti Manolescu, “Motives for Practicing Criticism as a ‘Rational
Science’ in Lord Kames’s Elements of Criticism,” Advances in the History of Rhetoric
5 (2001): 11–20 (p. 12) and “Traditions of Rhetoric, Criticism, and Argument in Lord
Kames’s Elements of Criticism,” Rhetoric Review 22 (2003): 225–42.
6Vincent M. Bevilacqua, “Lord Kames’s Theory of Rhetoric,” Speech Monographs
30 (1963): 309–27 (p. 313); Ross, “Scots,” cited in n. 4 above, pp. 620–1; Ross, Kames,
cited in n. 1 above, pp. 264–5.
7Arthur E. McGuinness, Henry Home, Lord Kames (New York: Twayne Publishers,
1970), 62.
8Helen Whitcomb Randall, “The Critical Theory of Lord Kames,” Smith College
Studies in Modern Languages 22 (1940–41): 23–27; Bevilacqua, “Lord,” cited in n. 6
above; compare Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, p. 262. On Newtonianism in Scottish
scientists and moralists see Roger L. Emerson, “Science and the Origins and Concerns
of the Scottish Enlightenment,” History of Science 26 (1988): 333–66.
9Gordon McKenzie, “Lord Kames and the Mechanist Tradition,” University of
California Publications in English 14 (1943): 93–121.
10James Boswell, Life of Johnson, ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1980), 414–5.
11Manolescu, “Traditions” and “Motives,” cited in n. 5 above.
12For literary and aesthetic approaches see for example Murray W. Bundy, “Lord
Kames and the Maggots in Amber,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 45
(1946): 199–208; Walter John Hipple, Jr., “Lord Kames,” The Beautiful, the Sublime,
and the Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1957) 99–121; András Horn, “Kames and the Anthropological
Approach to Criticism,” Philological Quarterly 44 (1965) 211–33; McKenzie, cited in n.
9 above. For rhetorical approaches, see for example Vincent M. Bevilacqua, “Rhetoric
and Human Nature in Kames’s Elements of Criticism,” Quarterly Journal of Speech
48 (1962): 46–50, and Bevilacqua, “Lord,” cited in n. 6 above; Neil Rhodes, “From
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Scottish rhetorics to their authors’ “other” works.13 Elements is of
particular interest since it offers a rare opportunity to explore the
relationship of rhetoric to law in eighteenth-century Scotland.14 To
the extent that Elements influenced the thinking and writing of others
on rhetoric,15 and that it was Kames (and Hutcheson) “who first
laid out the contours of this new cultural landscape” of the Scottish
Enlightenment,16 Kames’s legal career and writings may be more
important to understanding the origins of Scottish Enlightenment
rhetorics than heretofore recognized.
After considering why Kames did not write a legal rhetoric, I
argue that Kames’s decision to study and write about law to fulfill
his social aspirations offered a precedent for studying and writing
about criticism; that using principles of human nature partly for
pedagogical purposes in his legal works offered a precedent for using
them in Elements; and that the mode of reasoning used to compile
collections of legal decisions offered a precedent for the mode of
critical reasoning recommended in Elements.
Why not a legal rhetoric?
One answer to the question of why Kames did not write a rhetoric
of legal advocacy is that on occasion he used the term “rhetoric” to
Rhetoric to Criticism,” The Scottish Invention of English Literature, ed. Robert Crawford
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22–36; Manolescu, “Motives” and
“Traditions,” cited in n. 5 above.
13On Campbell see Arthur E. Walzer, George Campbell: Rhetoric in the Age of
Enlightenment (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). On Smith see
Stephen J. McKenna, “Fitting Words: Propriety in Adam Smith’s Rhetoric and Ethics,”
in Lynee Lewis Gaillet ed., Scottish Rhetoric and its Influences (Mahwah, NJ: Hermagoras
Press, 1998), 57–65.
14Perhaps the only other Scottish legal professional who wrote a rhetoric is
George Mackenzie who composed “What Eloquence is fit for the Bar” (1672)
and “Idea eloquentiae forensis hodierni” (1681); see Beth Innocenti Manolescu,
“George Mackenzie on Scottish Judicial Rhetoric,” Rhetorica 20 (2002): 275–88. John
W. Cairns, “Rhetoric, Language, and Roman Law: Legal Education and Improvement
in Eighteenth-Century Scotland,” Law and History Review 9 (1991): 31–58 focuses on
theories of rhetoric in relation to the teaching of law.
15See for example Bevilacqua, “Rhetoric,” cited in n. 12 above, pp. 49–50 and
“Lord,” cited in n. 6 above, pp. 323–7; Tytler, Memoirs, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, pp.
159–60.
16Arthur Herman, How the Scots Invented the Modern World: The True Story of How
Western Europe’s Poorest Nation Created our World and Everything in it (New York: Crown,
2001), 55.
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refer to a fine art but viewed legal advocacy as above all a practical
art. Although Kames does not use the word “rhetoric” in Elements, in
his Sketches of the History of Man (1774) he classifies both “rhetoric”
and “eloquence” as fine arts.17 In part this reflects a broader cultural
movement away from Ciceronian eloquence. As such, Elements is an
exemplar of a transition from the study of rhetoric as civic oratory to
rhetoric as belletristic criticism.18 Kames could have chosen to write a
rhetoric more in the classical tradition as did John Ward, for example;
but instead he chose to write a new rhetoric. I submit that he chose
to do so—that he would have held that eloquence conceived as a
fine art is inappropriate in legal advocacy—in part for personal and
institutional reasons.
Personal reasons include Kames’s own lack of eloquence. Tytler
has reported that Kames “wanted that command of copious elocution
which is necessary for an extemporaneous discussion of a laboured
argument.”19 Kames admits as much in an anecdote reported to
Boswell:
Lockhart, who was certainly one of the ablest barristers of his time, was
my antagonist in an action of damages for oppression and illegal impris-
onment. He made a most violent speech for the prosecutor, represented
my client as a monster, and with that inflammatory eloquence of which
he was so much a master, made a deep impression, as I perceived, on the
minds of the Judges. I was no match for him in this kind of rhetoric, but I
took a more effectual ground of defence. I saw that the facts in evidence
gave no support to the charge, to the extent which my adversary had
pushed it, and that all his philippic was a brutum fulmen, which a plain
statement of the evidence would dissipate in a moment. This I gave in a
few sentences, and with great coolness; saying, that I left it to the Court
to make the commentary, and to judge what foundation my brother
had for all his heat and intemperance. I need not tell you that I was
completely successful.20
17Lord Kames, Sketches of the History of Man, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1774), 70.
18On the transition generally, see Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-Century
British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 441–7; and Neil
Rhodes, “From Rhetoric to Criticism,” in Robert Crawford ed., The Scottish Invention of
English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22–36. On political
motivations for the transition, see Adam Potkay, The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of
Hume (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). On the significance of Elements with
respect to methods of practicing criticism, see Manolescu, “Traditions,” cited in n.
5 above.
19Tytler, Memoirs, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 64.
20Boswell, Private, cited in n. 1 above, p. 281.
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Kames’s successful, brief, and cool statement of the evidence points
to institutional reasons for the impropriety of eloquence in legal
advocacy: it was inefficient and could lead to suspicion. Inefficiency
was of particular concern in civil trials where little pleading was
involved; most of the business of the court was done in writing. The
exchanges of papers between advocates and judges led to a “prolixity
of written pleadings and arguments,” which resulted in a procedure
that was “unduly cumbrous and dilatory for transacting the day-to-
day business of the court.”21 As Ramsay has put it, “much speaking is
not the way to despatch [sic] much business.”22 Significantly, Kames
reported to Boswell that he first gained notice through a concise legal
paper. Lord Minto, a member of the Court of Session, praised Kames
for his ranking of an estate. “Mr. Home,” Kames recalled Minto
saying, “I am glad to see your name to this paper. You have done just
like a good Mathematician: thrown out the useless quantities and
given only the equations.”23
Suspicion of eloquence is commonplace in the European rhetori-
cal tradition but may have been salient for Kames and other advo-
cates particularly in a criminal trial. Unlike civil trials at the time,
criminal trials involved a fifteen-member jury selected by the pre-
siding judges and consisting of people of similar social condition
to the accused and typically from the neighborhood of the crime
or even people who participated in the capture of the accused.24
Ramsay has observed: “In no country did the scale incline more to
culprits than in Scotland at that period. The poorest, most friend-
less felon was defended by counsel, who, wishing to get a name,
took sometimes unwarrantable liberties with law and evidence. . . .
And what is worse, half-learned, pragmatical jurors are often mis-
led by declamation.”25 Tytler reports that Kames’s style of pleading
21T. B. Smith, Scotland: The Development of its Laws and Constitution (London:
Stevens and Sons, 1962) 91, 90. A brief overview of the legal process may be found in
John W. Cairns, “Legal Theory,” in Alexander Broadie ed., The Cambridge Companion to
the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 222–42 (pp.
229–30). For more detail, see Nicholas Phillipson, “The Scottish Whigs and the Reform
of the Court of Session 1785–1830,” diss. University of Cambridge, 1967 (Edinburgh:
The Stair Society, 1990), 45–6; John A. Inglis, “Eighteenth Century Pleading,” Juridical
Review 19 (1907–08): 42–57; and Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 123–30
22Ramsay, Scotland, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 51.
23Boswell, Private, cited in n. 1 above, p. 272.
24J. Irvine Smith, “Criminal Procedure,” An Introduction to Scottish Legal History
(Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1958) 426–48 (p. 441).
25Ramsay, Scotland, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 188–9.
Kames’s Elements of Criticism 245
“awakened no suspicion of rhetorical artifice.”26 Defending Kames
against the charge that he was too severe—Kames is reported to
have delivered a verdict of guilty to his chess companion, Mathew
Hay, accused of a capital crime with: “That’s checkmate to you,
Mathew!”27—Tytler explains that one of the judge’s duties is “to re-
strain the more natural, and therefore more frequent attempts of
the prisoner’s counsel to pervert the law, and confound the limits
of justice in the minds of the jury.”28 These observations show that
copious eloquence was a live option—that Kames could have cho-
sen to write a rhetoric of legal advocacy in the classical vein. But
in part because copious eloquence would be inappropriate in these
and other circumstances, and because Kames’s talents were not well-
suited to this kind of eloquence, he did not write a rhetoric of legal
advocacy.
Social Aspirations
Nor would a legal rhetoric have gained him the notice that El-
ements did. Kames’s decision to write a rhetoric of criticism had a
legal precedent in his decision to study and write about law; as
law helped him to fulfill social aspirations, so did criticism. The
eldest son in a family of perhaps nine children, Kames may ini-
tially have been sent to Edinburgh as an apprentice to a neighbor,
who was a Writer to the Signet, to prepare himself to manage his
father’s estate which he described to Boswell as “under a load of
debt” due to his father “being a Sportsman, keeping hounds, etc.”29
Writers to the Signet were essentially legal clerks. Training for this
position was practical rather than academic; it involved a three- to
five-year apprenticeship intended to provide “a knowledge of the
structure of deeds, and of the form of process before the Court of
Session.”30
26Tytler, Memoirs, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 62.
27See Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 301–11 for the full story.
28Tytler, Memoirs, vol. 2, cited in n. 1 above, p. 3.
29Boswell, Private, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 268, 269. See also Ramsay, Scotland,
vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 183. Kames’s father was engaged in a series of lawsuits
from 1725, two years after Kames was admitted to the Faculty of Advocates, to 1735.
By 1727 Kames could help to discharge the debts on the estate but did not completely
free it from debt until 1752 (Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, p. 5).
30Phillipson, cited in n. 21 above, p. 10; Ramsay, Scotland, vol. 1, cited in n. 1
above, p. 181.
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A position as Writer to the Signet would have been appropri-
ate for a person in Kames’s socioeconomic circumstances,31 but it
probably would not have enabled Kames to attain the aspirations
he developed during his apprenticeship.32 Boswell recorded Kames’s
recollection of a key incident:
One day I was sent with some paper to the Lord President’s (Dalrym-
ple’s). I was kept waiting in an outer room. I heard delightful Musick
upon a harpsichord in the next room, and I meditated on the hardship of
there being such distinctions amongst Mankind. ‘Why are the people
in that room enjoying such happiness, and I kept in a mean, drudging
way? Were I but fortunate enough to be on the other side of that Wall!’
I afterwards came to be very intimate in the Family, and reflected on
my former meditation.33
Thus Kames developed an aspiration to become an advocate before
the Court of Session. Since he was stationed at the lower end of
landed society, he could not afford to study civil law at a continental
university; the cost of study for a position on the Faculty of Advocates
may have seemed prohibitive.34 But Kames privately studied Latin,
31Ramsay, Scotland, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 181; Tytler, Memoirs, vol. 1, cited
in n. 1 above, p. 11.
32Perhaps the pinnacle of the profession was managing the estate of one of the
great landowners, but this would be available to only a few. Although conditions for
Writers of the Signet appear to have improved as the century continued, “it was a far
less aristocratic body than the faculty [of advocates], and probably poorer, for in the
Society’s minutes for 1731 there are references to many W.S.s who could not afford
to live on their incomes” (Phillipson, cited in n. 21 above, p. 10; John Stuart Shaw,
The Management of Scottish Society: 1707–1764 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1983), 35).
33Boswell, Private, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 269–70. Tytler reports the same event
with some additional and some slightly altered detail (Memoirs, vol. 1, cited in n. 1
above, pp. 12–4).
34A position on the faculty of advocates would be most attractive to those
between the lower end of landed society and sons of great landed families; those at
the lower end were barred by the cost of study and those at the higher end chose not
to enter due to lack of economic need and traditional prejudices (Shaw, Management,
cited in n. 32 above, pp. 23–4). On admittance to the faculty, see John W. Cairns,
“The Formation of the Scottish Legal Mind in the Eighteenth Century: Themes of
Humanism and Enlightenment in the Admission of Advocates,” in Neil MacCormick
and Peter Birks eds., The Legal Mind: Essays for Tony Honoré (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986), 253–77 (pp. 255–58); Klaus Luig, “The Institutes of National Law in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” trans. Sabine MacCormack, Juridical Review
17 (1972): 193–226 (p. 216); Tytler, Memoirs, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 15; Shaw,
Management, cited in n. 32 above, p. 27; Cairns, “Legal,” cited in n. 21 above, pp.
226–27.
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attended James Craig’s private College of Civil Law, and qualified
for admission in January 1723.35
No doubt hoping for advancement, in his first published col-
lection of decisions of the Court of Session Kames mentions that
Dalrymple encouraged him to undertake the work; praises Dalrym-
ple’s “fondness to protect and encourage, whatever has the shew
of rising merit;” and imagines that Dalrymple’s “long and well or-
dered life” coupled with “the affluences of fortune, the prosperity of
friends, and the applauses of mankind” must be a continual source
of “delightful reflections.”36 His collections of decisions and later his
Principles of Equity helped him to procure positions on the benches
of the Courts of Session and Justiciary.37 His decisions to practice
law and publish legal works were part of a program of personal
advancement.
Kames’s positions on the supreme civil and criminal courts in
Scotland were crown appointments, so fulfilling his aspirations re-
quired fashioning himself a good British subject.38 Scots law was
one of the few institutions that Scotland maintained following union
with England in 1707. But separate legal systems produced problems.
Scottish and English land tenure and conveyancing law had signif-
icantly diverged from each other, for example, and appeals could be
made from the Court of Session to the House of Lords. This worried
Scots because there was no statuatory provision for the presence of
a Scottish judge, and an English judge often heard and determined
these appeals in the absence of any person with training in Scots
law.39 Kames’s fear of English judges not knowing Scots law was
typical. In Historical Law-Tracts he expresses the hope that by treating
subjects common to both English and Scottish law he will suggest
the advantages of “establishing publick professors of both laws, and
giving suitable encouragement for carrying on together the study of
35Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, p. 14. On Kames’s admittance see Ramsay,
Scotland, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 180; Boswell, Private, cited in n. 1 above, p.
270; Ross, Kames, cited in n.1 above, p. 25; The Minute Book of the Faculty of Advocates,
1713–1750, ed. John Macpherson Pinkerton (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1980), 59.
36Lord Kames, Remarkable Decisions of the Court of Session. From 1716 to 1728, 2nd
ed. (1728; Edinburgh, 1790), iv.
37See Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, chs. 7 and 12.
38Kames was initially passed over for a position on the bench of the Court of
Session due to his father being a Jacobite and participating in the 1715 rebellion (Ross,
Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 113–5).
39See E. J. MacGillivray, “The Influence of English Law,” in An Introductory Survey
of the Sources and Literature of Scots Law (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1936), 207–25 (pp.
218–20).
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both.”40 He portrays himself as a “Briton who wishes a more compleat
Union.”41
Kames, like his contemporaries, was also interested in reform-
ing Scots law, with its origins in feudalism, in part to address the
circumstances of union with England and participation in the bur-
geoning British economy and empire. One holdover from feudal law
involved entails—“binding legal formulations which control succes-
sion and prevent heirs from disposing of land or contracting debt.”42
In Historical Law-Tracts Kames criticized the law of entail for, among
other things, subverting industry and commerce.43 Kames advocated
abolishing entail which would also make Scots law more in line with
English law. Freeing land for commerce and promoting industry
would contribute to the Scottish and British economy. Kames could
have supported entails; most members of the Court of Session did.
But Kames took a position supported by English judges.44
Kames participated in other areas involving legal reform that
could help Scotland’s position in the British empire. Antipathy be-
tween the Scots and English came to a head with the 1745 Jaco-
bite Rebellion. After its suppression, the British government took
steps to integrate the Scottish Highlands into the British economy. It
passed the Heritable Jurisdiction Act of 1747, which put Highland
land under royal jurisdiction, but it also attempted to put money from
this confiscated land back into the economy by subsidizing basic in-
dustries and establishing schools for teaching linen production and
English. Kames was a Commissioner for the Forfeited Estates and
involved in schemes for Highland improvement.45 In short, Kames’s
legal career and writings enabled him to fashion himself a British pa-
triot and thereby earn crown appointments which, in turn, enabled
him to fulfill his social aspirations.
Kames had these legal precedents at hand as his aspirations
turned to literary fame. According to Ramsay, after Kames was ap-
pointed Lord Ordinary on the Court of Session in 1752 his “pas-
sion for literary fame engrossed his thoughts.”46 Ramsay criticizes
40Lord Kames, Historical Law-Tracts, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1758), xiii.
41Historical, vol. 1, cited in n. 40 above, p. xv.
42Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, p. 210.
43Kames, Historical, vol. 1, cited in n. 40 above, p. 218. Kames appended a sketch
on entail to Sketches of the History of Man.
44Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 211–2.
45Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992), 119–20; Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 316–22.
46Ramsay, Scotland,vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 187.
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Kames for first spending Sundays and then Mondays—when the
Court of Session did not sit—composing rather than reading session
papers, and later for composing during “that part of the mornings
and evenings which he used to set apart for his Outer and Inner
House business.”47 Among the works composed during this time
was Elements.
Kames could fulfill his aspirations with a well-received book
on criticism because, like other Scottish literati, Kames aimed to rid
his writing of Scotticisms and write proper English. Ramsay reports
that “the language of [Kames’s] social hour was pure Scots, nowise
like what he spoke on the bench, which approached to English.”48
Something of his accent may be gleaned from an anecdote which
finds him nodding off on the bench and, when awakened by some-
one’s entrance and told, “Oh! it’s a woman, my Lord, accused of child
murder,” responding, “And a weel farred bitch too.”49 Kames’s efforts
to write proper English were common to Scots; in his Critical Review
Smollett pointed to impurities and errors in the language of the books
reviewed, including Scotticisms; the rhetorics of Smith, Campbell,
and Blair focused on the English language rather than Scots.50 In Ele-
ments Kames fashions himself a good British subject in part by setting
apart its critical method from that of the French;51 citing Britons’ claim
to literary fame, Shakespeare, significantly more often than any other
author;52 and dedicating the book to King George III. Elements ad-
dressed the provincialism that could interfere with Kames’s literary
aspirations. Moreover, by participating in the broader cultural move
47Ramsay, Scotland, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 187.
48Ramsay, Scotland, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 211–2.
49Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 72, 303; see also Clausdirk Pollner, “English,
Scots and the Scottish Literati,” in Peter L. Oesterreich and Thomas O. Sloane eds.,
Rhetorica Movet: Studies in Historical and Modern Rhetoric in Honour of Heinrich F. Plett
(Leiden: Brill, 1999), 335–41.
50See Pollner, “English,” cited in n. 49 above, and James G. Basker, “Scotticisms
and the Problem of Cultural Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” Eighteenth-
Century Life 15 (1991): 81–95. Various degrees of contempt for the Scottish critic
may be seen in Voltaire and Johnson (Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 285–6;
Theodore Besterman, “Voltaire on Shakespeare,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century 54 (1967), 85–9; Boswell, Life, cited in n. 10 above, pp. 414–5). For the Scottish
and English rivalry more broadly, see Colley, Britons, cited in n. 45 above, pp. 117–32
and Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 327–9.
51On French antecedents of Scottish rhetoric, see Barbara Warnick, The Sixth
Canon: Belletristic Rhetorical Theory and French Antecedents (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1993).
52Manolescu, “Motives,” cited in n. 5 above.
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toward a “polite” belletristic style rather than civic “eloquence,”
Kames aligned himself politically with Court against Country, Whig
against “mob”—another step toward achieving social aspirations.53
His legal career had set a precedent for choosing subject matter, pub-
lishing on it, and fashioning himself a good British subject as a way
of addressing personal ambitions.
Pedagogical Purposes of
Principles of Human Nature
As Kames’s legal works offered a precedent for using a critical
work to help him fulfill his aspirations, so the use of principles of
human nature in both kinds of works could help others to fulfill
theirs. Principles of human nature contributed to the pedagogical
aims of Kames’s legal and critical programs.54 Specifically, principles
of human nature could serve as an alternative to reasoning by au-
thority and as an entrée to specialized, technical reasoning. Kames’s
project of tracing law and criticism to principles of human nature was
motivated in part by his own education. Kames complained about
his early training in language and law that he was not taught the
meaning behind rules. He reported to Boswell that his first tutor
“made me get Despauter’s grammar by heart” and described this
grammar as his “daily persecution during the most important pe-
riod of life.”55 The problem with the method of instruction, according
to Kames, was that he “had not the least notion of what the rules
meant. . . . After an interval of three years, I took up Despauter’s
Grammar and found I knew nothing of the matter, and then I began
to study Grammar philosophically.”56 Similarly, Kames complained
about his early legal training: “There was a notion then (but a very
erroneous one) that the best education for a Lawyer was to be some
years in a Writer’s Chamber. I think this the worst education. It is
53Potkay, Fate, cited in n. 18 above, pp. 3–7.
54On Kames’s use of principles of human nature in his criticism and legal thought
in the context of the history of ideas, see Bevilacqua, “Rhetoric,” cited in n. 12 above
and “Lord,” cited in n. 6 above; MacCormick, “Law,” cited in n. 3 above, pp. 157–8,
160; Forbes, “Natural,” cited in n. 2 above, p. 197; Lieberman, “Legal” and Province,
cited in n. 3 above. It became commonplace for Enlightenment thinkers to ground
a variety of disciplines in human nature.
55Boswell, Private, cited in n. 1 above, p. 269; Lord Kames, Loose Hints upon
Education, Chiefly concerning the Culture of the Heart (Edinburgh, 1781), 251–2.
56Boswell, Private, cited in n. 1 above, p. 269.
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consuming so much time in mere copying of Styles. The meaning is
never explained.”57
The preface to Elucidations on the Common and Statute Law of
Scotland resonates with his complaints about his early education:
“What are our law-books but a mass of naked propositions, drawn
chiefly from the decisions of our supreme courts, rarely connected
either with premises or consequences.”58 The problem is that “law-
students, trained to rely upon authority, seldom think of questioning
what they read: they husband their reasoning faculty, as if it would
rust by exercise.”59 Kames hopes “only to give examples of reasoning,
free from the shackles of authority.”60 For Kames this means, in part,
grounding legal principles in human nature.
To see how principles of human nature serve as an entrée to more
specialized and technical legal reasoning, compare the beginning
of his discussion of jus tertii in Essays Upon Several Subjects in Law
(1732) with a revision of the essay in Elucidations.61 In Several Subjects
Kames explains the principle of jus tertii—“When a Man pleads any
Point, in which he has no LEGAL INTEREST, i.e. from the gaining of
which he can propose to himself no just or reasonable Advantage,
he is remov’d personali objectione from pleading such Point”—with
a broad legal principle: “For the Law encourages no Man to stand
in the Way of his Neighbour, unless his own Interest be at Stake.”62 In
Elucidations in contrast he deduces the legal principle from a principle
of human nature: “No rational man ever acts unless with an intention
to produce some effect. Therefore, in a court of justice, however well
founded an action or a defence may be in itself, it will be rejected
as idle and foolish, if the person who acts can draw no benefit from
it, or have no interest in it, as expressed in law-terms. Hence a rule,
That right without interest will not be sustained in a process, either
by way of action or objection: and as little will interest without
57Boswell, Private, cited in n. 1 above, p. 269. By “copying of Styles” Kames
meant the examples of summonses and letters which passed the Signet and were
included in style books.
58Lord Kames, Elucidations Respecting the Common and Statute Law of Scotland
(Edinburgh, 1777), vii.
59Kames, Elucidations, cited in n. 58 above, vii–viii.
60Kames, Elucidations, cited in n. 58 above, xii.
61Several Subjects consists of four essays on four different titles. Three of them
were revised and reprinted in Elucidations, a work that covers forty-two titles. In
Elucidations “Jus Tertii” is Article XXXII, “What Interest is sufficient to entitle one to
sue or defend.” The other essay in Several Subjects is incorporated into Principles of
Equity.
62Lord Kames, Essays Upon Several Subjects in Law (Edinburgh, 1732), 1.
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right.”63 I submit that, since Kames composed Several Subjects for
legal professionals64 but directed Elucidations in part to law students,
he incorporated principles of human nature into the latter in part to
make it more accessible to beginning students.
Elucidations is published after Elements, but Kames’s Historical
Law-Tracts offered a precedent for using principles of human nature
for pedagogical purposes in Elements. In the preface to Historical Law-
Tracts Kames complains: “Law, like geography, is taught as if it were a
collection of facts merely: the memory is employed to the full, rarely
the judgment.”65 He proposes to remedy this problem by making law
“a rational study.”66 He imagines a broader audience than legal spe-
cialists; he aims not for “the vulgar”—those who are more interested
in subjects like wars and conquests which “excite wonder”—but
instead for “readers of solid judgment [who] find more entertain-
ment in studying the constitution of a state, its government, its laws,
the manners of its people: whose reason is exercised in discovering
causes and tracing effects through a long train of dependencies.”67 He
also describes his audience as “every man of taste who is desirous
to acquire the true spirit of law.”68
The broader audience helps to account for the use of principles
of human nature in the first three tracts. The opening sentences of the
first tract, “History of Criminal Law,” note that “a class of principles”
that are part of “the human System” are “the Source of the criminal
Law”; that these principles are “obviously intended to promote Soci-
ety”; and that “to form a just notion of them, we need but reflect upon
what we feel when we commit a Crime, or witness it.”69 The next two
tracts, “History of Promises and Covenants” and “History of Prop-
erty,” also open with discussion of the foundation of legal principles
63Kames, Elucidations, cited in n. 58 above, p. 213.
64He also sought professional notice; in the same year the essays were published,
he unsuccessfully applied for the Chair of Roman Law at Edinburgh University (Ross,
Kames, cited in n. 1 above, p. 36), but Tytler reports that the essays “procured to their
author the character of a profound and scientific lawyer; and from the period of their
publication, we find Mr Home engaged in most of the causes of importance which
occurred in the Court of Session” (Memoirs, vol. 1, cited in n. 1 above, p. 80).
65Kames, Historical, vol. 1, cited in n. 40 above, p. v. Ross “Scots,” cited in n.
4 above, p. 620 and Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 263–4 suggests that Kames follows
Stair in this complaint.
66Kames, Historical, vol. 1, cited in n. 40 above, p. v.
67Kames, Historical, vol. 1, cited in n. 40 above, pp. vi–vii.
68Kames, Historical, vol. 1, cited in n. 40 above, p. viii.
69Kames, Historical, vol. 1, cited in n. 40 above, p. 1.
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in human nature, in passion, particularly.70 Subsequent tracts are nar-
rower in scope and more technical, dealing with particular questions
respecting property, jurisdiction, and forms of process, for example.
They involve almost no use of principles of human nature, probably
because many of them are relevant to property so it would be redun-
dant to repeat the philosophical analysis of the earlier tracts.71 Still,
the use of principles of human nature in the first tracts fulfills the
pedagogical function of preparing students for more specialized and
technical reasoning in subsequent tracts.72
Kames described the pedagogical program of Elements in similar
terms, noting that
the ordinary method of education [. . .] after some years spent in ac-
quiring languages, hurries us, without the least preparatory discipline,
into the most profound philosophy. A more effectual method to alienate
the tender mind from abstract science, is beyond the reach of invention:
and accordingly, with respect to such speculations, our youth generally
contract a sort of hobgoblin terror, seldom if ever subdued.73
The solution is to study criticism as a rational science. Criticism
becomes a rational science by studying “the sensitive branch of
human nature, to trace the objects that are naturally agreeable, as
well as those that are naturally disagreeable,” not by appealing
to authority.74 Learning about “the sensitive branch” or principles
of human nature prepares students to reason upon more difficult
subjects:
70Kames, Historical, vol. 1, cited in n. 40 above, pp. 91–2, 124–6.
71On property see Tract IV, “History of securities upon land for payment of
debt;” Tract V, “History of the privilege which an heir-apparent in a feudal holding
has, to continue the possession of his ancestor;” and Tract VI, “History of regalities,
and of the privilege of repledging.” The latter tract leads to discussions of jurisdiction
in Tracts VII, VIII, and IX. Tracts X, XI, and XII cover issues relating to debt which
leads to Tract XIII on heirs and Tract XIV on the valuation of land and the claim of an
heir apparent to a predecessor’s land.
72Kames’s use of principles of human nature in his legal writings could also
contribute to legal reform more broadly by serving as a way to rationalize the study
of law. His use of such principles in Historical Law-Tracts gained him notice in France
where some of the early tracts were translated into French and he was invited to join
an international Society of Citizens organized to perfect moral science and legislation
(Ross, Kames, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 216–8). As nation-states attempted to reform their
legal systems (Luig, “Institutes,” cited in n. 34 above), making law rational would
be appealing. I choose to highlight the pedagogical motive of using such principles
because Kames does.
73Lord Kames, Elements of Criticism, 6th ed., vol. 1, (Edinburgh, 1785), 8.
74Kames, Elements, vol. 1, cited in n. 73 above, pp. 6, 12.
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the science of criticism may be considered as a middle link, connecting
the different parts of education into a regular chain. This science fur-
nisheth an inviting opportunity to exercise the judgement: we delight to
reason upon subjects that are equally pleasant and familiar: we proceed
gradually from the simpler to the more involved cases: and in a due
course of discipline, custom, which improves all our faculties, bestows
acuteness on that of reason, sufficient to unravel all the intricacies of
philosophy.75
Kames’s pedagogical purposes in Elements include making criticism
accessible for select members of the middling classes.76 Kames assigns
the practice of criticism to a middling audience as he notes that taste is
the province of neither the vulgar nor voluptuousness—neither those
who depend on bodily labor nor those corrupted by riches.77 Kames
contrasts the values of the rich with those of a middling audience:
the rich indulge in “costly furniture, numerous attendants, a princely
dwelling, sumptuous feasts, every thing superb and gorgeous, to
amaze and humble all beholders: simplicity, elegance, propriety, and
things natural, sweet, or amiable, are despised or neglected.”78 He
positions criticism as a pastime preferable to other activities and
pursuits that those of middling status may engage in: in youth,
hunting, gaming, and drinking; in middle age, ambition; in old age,
avarice.79 Thus Kames stakes out a territory for select members of the
middling classes.
The role of reasoning upon feeling in his critical program is
highlighted by his Introduction to the Art of Thinking.80 The book is
designed for a young audience and consists of chapters of lists of
maxims and a section of historical and allegorical illustrations. Kames
explains how the maxims and illustrations are designed to exercise
the reasoning faculty: “The historical illustrations are put at the end
of the book, that young readers may exercise themselves in drawing
morals from them. After fixing upon a moral, they will be curious to
compare it with the moral or maxim in the foregoing part, which they
75Kames, Elements, vol. 1, cited in n. 73 above, pp. 8–9.
76For more detail on criticism and socioeconomic status, see Manolescu, “Mo-
tives,” cited in n. 5 above, pp. 14–6 and Manolescu, “Traditions,” cited in n. 5 above,
pp. 237–9.
77Kames, Elements, vol. 2, cited in n. 73 above, pp. 499–502.
78Kames, Elements, vol. 2, cited in n. 73 above, p. 500.
79Kames, Elements, vol. 1, cited in n. 73 above, p. 9.
80Cairns, “Rhetoric,” cited in n. 14 above, pp. 37–8 has also drawn a parallel
between Kames’s desire for improvement in legal education and Introduction to the
Art of Thinking.
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cannot mistake, as every maxim and its illustration have the same
number. This exercise may at first be difficult; but perseverance will
render it easy, and in time delightful.”81 The key is to abstract from
the illustration a relevant principle of human nature. Kames puts this
project in a pedagogical context: instead of leaping from studies of
particulars such as geography and history to abstract studies such
as logic and metaphysics, Kames recommends his Art of Thinking
as an intermediate link designed to improve the ability to abstract
by providing human nature as a familiar, agreeable, and instructive
subject to reason upon.82 Thus principles of human nature may not
only be a part of the reasoning in Kames’s legal and critical works,
but may also serve as subject matter to reason upon.
This kind of pedagogical concern helps to explain the length of
Elements. Paging through the book, particularly the chapters applying
critical principles, shows the many extracts from authors that Kames
includes. There is plenty of material upon which to reason and
exercise judgment. Likewise, in the preface to his 1741 dictionary
of decisions, he asserts:
Most of our knowledge, especially that of law, is by induction. It must,
therefore, be of singular use to such as apply themselves to this study,
that there are at hand a great number and variety of cases, ready
invented, upon which they may exercise their reason. . . . It seems
plain then, that a variety of law cases, tho’ but barely proposed, must
be of advantage: They are a stock of materials for the mind to work
upon; an opportunity is afforded us to apply principles, the judgment is
exercised, and by exercise ripens to its perfection.83
As the next section shows, the process of compiling these collections
of decisions and the kind of reasoning Kames recommends in Ele-
ments involve the same kind of abstraction of principles from a case
that Kames recommends as an exercise in Art of Thinking.
Mode of Reasoning
Legal reasoning in Scots law involves a mix of the civilian and
English Common Law traditions—the civil tradition deriving from
81Lord Kames, Introduction to the Art of Thinking, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh, 1775), viii.
82Introduction, cited in n. 81 above, pp. iv-v.
83Lord Kames, The Decisions of the Court of Session, from its first Institution to the
Present Time. Abridged, and Digested under proper Heads, in Form of a Dictionary, 2nd ed.
(1741; Edinburgh, 1791), vi–vii.
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continental influences and the English from union with England.
Lord Cooper has described the differences between the two methods
of reasoning as follows, noting that he deliberately overstates the
position “with the object of throwing an elusive object into high
relief.”84
A civilian system differs from a common law system much as rational-
ism differs from empiricism or deduction from induction. The civilian
naturally reasons from principles to instances, the common lawyer from
instances to principles. The civilian puts his faith in syllogisms, the com-
mon lawyer in precedents; the first silently asking himself as each new
problem arises, “What should we do this time?” and the second asking
aloud in the same situation, “What did we do last time?” The civilian
thinks in terms of rights and duties, the common lawyer in terms of
remedies. The civilian is chiefly concerned with the policy and rationale
of a rule of law, the common lawyer with its pedigree. The instinct of the
civilian is to systematize. The working rule of the common lawyer is
solvitur ambulando.85
These two kinds of reasoning are blended in the attempt to identify
rationes decidendi, the clarification of which is the practical purpose
of Kames’s collections of decisions of the Court of Session. The
ratio decidendi is the principle underlying a judicial decision or the
proposition of law that is the basis of the decision. It is abstracted
from the allegations, facts, arguments, opinions, and judgment of a
case. For example,
to say that a man is entitled to recover damages from one who has
caused him loss, injury or damage without legal justification is a general
principle from which may be deduced, in the circumstances of an actual
case, the ratio that if a defender has caused another person loss and
damage by knocking him down with his car, an action lacking legal
justification, the other person may recover damages from the defender.86
84Thomas Mackay Cooper, “The Common and the Civil Law–A Scot’s View,”
Harvard Law Review 63 (1950): 468–75 (p. 471).
85Cooper, “Common,” cited in n. 84 above, pp. 470–71.
86David M. Walker, The Scottish Legal System: An Introduction to the Study of Scots
Law, 3rd ed. rev. (Edinburgh: Green and Sons, 1969), 357. Other material on the ratio
decidendi is taken from the same source, pp. 356, 349–50. See pp. 349–50 n. 27 for
periodical literature on ratio decidendi. Walker describes the task of determining the
ratio decidendi as one “of extreme importance and considerable difficulty for which
unfortunately no settled formula or rules of thumb can be suggested; it cannot be
done mechanically; it is an art rather than a science” (349).
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Kames said that he did not “like to recollect” the amount of time
spent working on the dictionary of decisions: “The difficulty was to
trace the steps which led to each decision, to find out a ratio decidendi
and place it under a head. . . . I have been ten hours studying one
decision to fix its proper principle and place.”87
The identification and use of rationes decidendi in cases of Scots
law served as a precedent for Kames’s identification and use of
principles of human nature relevant to particular performances in
the fine arts. In Kames’s model of critical argument, principles of
human nature may be said to serve as rationes decidendi for judgments
upon performances in the fine arts. The following remarks on a
passage from Otway’s Venice Preserv’d illustrate the point: “Figurative
expression, being the work of an enlivened imagination, cannot be the
language of anguish or distress. Otway, sensible of this, has painted
a scene of distress in colours finely adapted to the subject: there is
scarce a figure in it, except a short and natural simile with which the
speech is introduced.”88 Kames takes the case of the passage from
Otway and pronounces a decision: the passage is good because it is a
scene of distress with almost no figures in it. The principle of human
nature that functions as a ratio is that anguish or distress cannot
manifest itself in figurative expression. This ratio may be deduced
from the general principle that figurative expression is the work of
an enlivened imagination.
We can imagine Kames poring over an edition of Shakespeare,
identifying passages that to him are pleasing or displeasing, and
searching for a ratio that he could use to justify his critical judgment.
And we can imagine readers of Elements learning to do the same.
If I want to justify my decision that Hamlet’s “To be or not to be”
soliloquy uses a flawed metaphor (how can one take arms against a
sea of troubles?), I search for a ratio involving not a legal system but
the system of human nature, perhaps discovering something along
these lines: metaphors must be literally imaginable.
Conceiving of principles of human nature as rationes decidendi
refines the position that the principles serve as warrants for critical
judgments and helps to explain the organization of the book.89 Con-
ceiving of the warrants in critical judgments as rationes decidendi asks
us to distinguish general principles of human nature, such as those
87Quoted in Walker, Jurists, cited in n. 1 above, p. 224.
88Kames, Elements, vol. 1, cited in n. 73 above, pp. 497–8.
89See Manolescu “Motives” and “Traditions,” cited in n. 5 above; compare Ross,
“Scots,” cited in n. 4 above, p. 622 and Kames, cited in n. 1 above, p. 265.
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found in the opening two chapters, from the rules involving practical
examples of the principles in a particular performance in the fine arts,
such as those found in the next nine chapters.90 Thus Kames takes
human nature as a source of general principles, from which may be
deduced in the circumstances of a particular performance a practical
example of a general principle in the form of a statement about hu-
man nature with respect to the fine arts. Such a view helps to explain
why Kames first offers general principles of human nature as distinct
from those particularly relevant to the fine arts. Moreover, it helps
to explain the observation that “there is a vast proliferation of princi-
ples appropriated to the various classes of phenomena, all attested
by an appeal to sense and feeling.”91 Understanding the principles of
human nature as rationes decidendi helps to explain why Kames is not
inclined to reduce the number of principles.
The aim of identifying the critical and legal principles is to
reach a standard. In the dictionary of decisions Kames observes that
decisions help law progress toward a standard. Kames remarks that,
compared to Roman law, Scots law was inferior because it had had
less time to mature than the Roman law. No art or science, according
to Kames, requires more time than jurisprudence “to ripen it and
to bring it to a standard.”92 Kames refers to a time when the law of
Scotland “shall be brought to a standard, (which may be expected
in length of time, if due care be taken of providing us with able
judges).”93 How he believes Scotland will achieve this standard is
noteworthy: general rules will be formed through the induction of
many cases. The problem with statute law is that statutes “enact
in general upon all similar cases; and as man is but short sighted
with regard to consequences, ‘tis odds but, in remedying one evil, a
greater is produced.”94 The decisions of a court of justice, in contrast,
“are adapted to particular circumstances. If upon any occasion they
chance to stray, ‘tis but to return again, with greater certainty of the
road. They creep along with wary steps, until, at last, by induction
of many cases, which have been fixed in the course of practice, a
90Kames, Elements, vol. 1, cited in n. 73 above, pp. 195–6.
91Hipple, cited in n. 12 above, p. 100. A review in The Library 2 (May 1762)
criticizes Elements in part because Kames “multiplies the principles of human nature
without cause” (261). Arthur Murphy may have also had this in mind as he com-
mented that it seems “as if he had been for years anatomising the heart of man, and
peeping into every cranny of it” (Boswell, Life, cited in n. 10 above, pp. 414–5).
92Kames, Decisions, cited in n. 83 above, p. v.
93Kames, Decisions, cited in n. 83 above, p. vii.
94Kames, Decisions, cited in n. 83 above, p. vii–viii.
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general rule is with safety formed.”95 Discovering rationes decidendi,
then, may be understood as a step in improving Scots law, in helping
it to reach a standard. Likewise, Kames’s discovery of principles of
human nature that ground judgment of performances in the fine arts
is designed to help taste progress to a standard.96 Reaching these
standards may lead to individual advancement. For Kames they also
leave Scots better positioned with respect to Britons, and Britons
better positioned in the republic of letters.
Conclusion
A close look at Kames’s social aspirations, pedagogical aims,
and modes of reasoning reveals that Kames’s legal career and works
offered precedents for Elements. These precedents suggest that his
jurisprudence may have shaped the nature of the critical reasoning
Kames uses in Elements, its selection of texts for critical examination,
its organization, and its length. For example, the preponderance of
passages from Shakespeare contributes not only to social advance-
ment but also provides familiar material to reason upon. Passages
from Shakespeare and others not only serve this function but also
illustrate principles of human nature in general and with respect to
the fine arts—two levels of reasoning that resonate with the presence
of general legal principles and rationes decidendi in Scots law, and that
Kames treats separately and in sequence in Elements. The number
of passages makes the book swell to multiple volumes but is conso-
nant with the need to reason upon many cases in order to identify
principles—a process that does not simply involve induction—and
reach a standard. Reasoning by means of principles of human na-
ture in both law and criticism contributed to Kames’s reputation, in
part because such reasoning made the subject matter and practices
accessible for a broader audience.
95Kames, Decisions, cited in n. 83 above, p. viii.
96Kames, Elements, vol. 2, cited in n. 73 above, 503–4.
